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I. Introduction
The case of Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales' concerns a
homosexual Mexican man who fled to the United States to escape
the excessive abuse he faced at the hands of family, "friends," and
public officials in Mexico.' Francisco Ornelas-Chavez arrived in
the United States in 1998.3 In July 2003, the Imnmigration Courts
tried to remove him.4
The Immigration Courts proceeded on the premise that
because he had not reported his abuse to the Mexican authorities,'
he could not show that the government acquiesced or had
I Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
2 Id. at 1054.
3 Id. at 1054-55.
4 Id. at 1055.
5 These were, coincidentally, the same authorities who were known for not only
abusing, but going so far as to murder homosexual men.
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knowledge of his abuse and torture, a finding that would be
necessary in order to qualify for protection under the Convention
Against Torture.6 On review, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit created a rule that the Immigration Courts
cannot require an individual to report incidents of abuse to the
authorities to qualify for protection under the Convention Against
Torture and that a finding of government acquiescence to torture
can be found from other evidence.7
This Note will explore the facts and holdings of Ornelas-
Chavez in Part II. Part III will examine the background law in this
area, and Part IV will provide an analysis of the court's opinion.
Finally, Part V will conclude that while this extension seems very
logical on a public policy basis, it will need to be tightened in the
near future or risk being an open door to a slippery slope in the
United States' immigration decisions.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Francisco Ornelas-Chavez's abuse started at a very young
age.8 He was born a male but preferred to express a female
identity in both his dress and relationship decisions. 9 It was
because of this female identity that his family began abusing
him.' He was severely beaten by both his father and mother. 1
His father even permitted a friend to drug and rape Ornelas-
Chavez in order to humiliate him.' 2 From age six until age twelve,
Ornelas-Chavez was repeatedly raped by two of his cousins. 3
From age seven until age nine he was also raped by a worker on
his grandfather's plantation. 4
6 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058. Background information on the Convention
Against Torture can be found in Part III.
7 Id. at 1060.
8 Id. at 1054.
9 Id.
10 Id.
" Id.
12 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1054.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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. Not only was Omelas-Chavez abused by his family, but there
were several instances of abuse that occurred at the hands of
public officials as well. For instance, he reported the beatings
from his family to his second grade teacher, who told him that
only "fags" wore women's clothes and failed to report his abuse to
the proper authorities. 5 When he was sixteen, his father asked the
local police, chief to arrest and detain Ornelas-Chavez "to teach
[him] to behave."' 16
Later in his life, Omelas-Chavez began working at the state
prison as a correctional officer, where his co-workers continuously
threatened and beat him.'7 When Ornelas-Chavez complained to
his supervisor, he was told to quit.'8 Ornelas-Chavez did quit but
returned two years later because he, thought conditions might have
changed.' 9 Upon his return, several co-workers tried to suffocate
him, and when he reported this incident, he was again told to
quit.' °
Ornelas-Chavez feared reporting incidents of his own abuse
because two of his homosexual acquaintances had been murdered
by police and left "with sticks inserted in their rectums.' He
lived in fear in Mexicali with his aunt for five years, until his
father found him and beat him once again.22 Finally, in 1998,
Ornelas-Chavez fled to the United States.23 In 2003, the United
States began removal proceedings against him because he had not
properly entered the country.24
B. Immgration Judge
The Immigration Judge was the first to hear Ornelas-Chavez's
arguments to be granted asylum and allowed to remain in the
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1053.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1055.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Omelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1055.
20071
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United States.25 The Immigration Judge found that Ornelas-
Chavez "failed to show exceptional circumstances for filing his
application for asylum later than one year after entering the United
States." 6 The Immigration Judge also found that he had failed to
show evidence of past torture, mental or physical intentionally
inflicted severe pain, or suffering sanctioned by a public official.27
Because of those findings, the Immigration Judge denied Ornelas-
Chavez's petition for withholding of removal.28
C. Board of Immigration Appeals
Ornelas-Chavez appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals. 29 The Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, finding that
the only incident involving public officials was when his father
had him locked up.30 The Board of Immigration Appeals also
found that because other incidents were not reported to the
Mexican authorities, those incidents could not count as occurring
at the acquiescence of public officials, as is necessary to qualify
for withholding of removal. "'
Further, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that though
Omelas-Chavez was able to clearly document the unfortunate
conditions of homosexual men in Mexico in general, that
documentation did not demonstrate that the government was
unwilling or unable to control those who harmed Ornelas-Chavez
25 Id. at 1053.
26 Id. at 1055. A applicant for asylum must show "by clear and convincing
evidence that the application has been filed within one year after the date of [his or her]
arrival in the U.S." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2) (B) (2000). There are two exceptions to this
deadline, however: 1) "changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's
eligibility for asylum" or 2) "extraordinary circumstances." REGINA GERMAIN, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 86 (2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a) (2) (D)). Ornelas-Chavez would have had to show that there were "events or
factors directly related to the failure to meet the one-year deadline" in order to
demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" and be excluded from the one-year deadline
for filing. Id. at 86 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a) (5)).
27 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1055.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
[Vol. XXXI
ABUSE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ASYLUM
specifically.3 2 The Board of Immigration Appeals also affirmed
the Convention Against Torture decision by the Immigration
Judge in a one-sentence holding with no reasoning.33
D. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Ornelas-Chavez then appealed his case to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.34 The Ninth Circuit found that the Board of
Immigration Appeals applied an improper standard under both the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRARA)35  and the Convention Against Torture.3 6
However, because the Board of Immigration Appeals did not state
whether it conducted de novo review, and there was a complete
lack of analysis in the opinion, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
Immigration Judge's decision assuming that the Board of
Immigration Appeals gave significant weight to the Immigration
Judge's decision.37
The Immigration Judge found that Ornelas-Chavez did not
establish that the government sanctioned his torture.38 The Ninth
Circuit held that this standard was too high.39 The court noted a
line of cases that implicitly prohibit the court from requiring the
reporting of torture to public officials for public policy reasons.4°
It is too high of a standard to require the victim to have reported
the abuse or torture to the government; 4' therefore, the Ninth
Circuit remanded for a decision under the proper standard, where
all of Ornelas-Chavez's evidence of his abuse and torture, and
even evidence not reported to the government, shall be evaluated
32 Id.
33 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1055.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1056 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) (2006)).
36 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (1) (I) (2006)).
37 See Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000).
38 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058.
39 Id. The Court of Appeals begins its decision by noting that in Zheng v. Ashcroft,
the court held that the government does not need to have actual knowledge of the torture.
Id. (citing 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003)).
40 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1060.
41 See infra Part III.
2007]
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to determine if the government demonstrated "willful blindness. 42
lII.Background Law
A. Protection Under the Convention Against Torture
In 1975, the Convention Against Torture was proposed by the
United Nations in order to "make more effective the struggle
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world. ' 43  The Convention Against
Torture required that participating states legislate "to prevent acts
of torture in any territory in its jurisdiction." 44  Further, it
mandated that "[n]o State shall expel, return ("refouler") or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture. ' 45  The United States implemented the
Convention Against Torture in its Code of Federal Regulations.46
To qualify for protection under the Convention Against
Torture, one must have suffered torture by a public official.47 In
the case where the torture was not actually at the hands of a public
official, however, an individual can still qualify for protection if
the public official was aware of the activity, but did not
intervene.48 In analyzing the Convention Against Torture, the
courts have expanded this awareness by public officials and ruled
that the officials do not need actual knowledge of the torture.49
Nor is it necessary for the public official to have physical control
over the applicant during the abuse and torture. 50 Essentially, the
42 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1060-61.
43 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46/Annex (Dec. 10, 1984).
44 Convention Against Torture, supra note 43, art. 2.
45 Convention Against Torture, supra note 43, art. 3.
46 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2006).
47 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (1) (2006).
48 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a) (7) (2006). This statute clearly fulfills the mission of the
Convention Against Torture to prevent torture, not just torture specifically inflicted by
public officials. The mission would not be met if individuals could be tortured by
private individuals not punished by the government, for the human right against torture
extends beyond abuse simply from public officials.
49 See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).
50 See Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
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language of the Code of Federal Regulations seems to indicate that
the public officials may have constructive knowledge of and
control over whomever is inflicting the torture." However, the
courts have followed the public policy rationale and the reasoning
behind the Convention Against Torture and found that there are
often instances where the torture is not directly coming from
government officials or being specifically ignored by government
officials, but to protect human dignity, that individual should not
be removed from the United States.52 In these circumstances it
remains likely that the torture will resume when he returns to his
home country.53
B. Reporting of Incidents to the Authorities
The case law concerning the reporting of torture and abuse to
authorities developed under the withholding of a removal statute
which requires a showing of "past persecution. 5 4 Because the
requirements are similar, an analysis of protection under the
Convention Against Torture applies the same logic that developed
from these cases.55 There are four cases that develop the idea of
requiring an individual to report incidents of torture to government
authorities.
Baballah v. Ashcroft 6 concerned an Israeli who was
"repeatedly threatened and attacked.., on account of his ethnicity
and religion" for over ten years.57 In this case, the court held that
because the abuse was at the hands of government actors, it was
not necessary to discuss whether the events were reported to the
government.58 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[o]nly
when non-governmental actors are responsible for persecution do
we consider whether an applicant reported the incidents to police,
because in such cases a report of this nature may show
51 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2006).
52 See infra Part IV.
53 Id.
54 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) (2006).
55 See Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1060.
56 367 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).
57 Id. at 1070.
58 Id. at 1078.
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governmental inability to control the actors."59  This statement
could be interpreted to mean that the courts ought to consider
whether one reported the incidents, but it does not explicitly say
that reporting of abuse was mandatory. It does, however, raise the
question of how important reporting to the authorities is in
situations where the torture is not directly from the government
officials.
Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft6° has similar facts to those in Ornelas-
Chavez, concerning a male, Latin American petitioner with a
female identity.6' The Ninth Circuit in Reyes-Reyes did not
expressly rule on the issue of whether it is necessary for an
individual to report non-governmental abuse to allow a petition for
withholding of removal, 62 but it did specifically note that "the
imposition of such a bright line rule would indeed be troubling. 63
While the court in Reyes-Reyes did not have to rule on the per se
rule imposed by the Immigration Judge because it could remand
on other grounds, it seemed to disapprove of any per se reporting
requirement. 64
In Castro-Perez v. Gonzales,65 the Ninth Circuit denied a
Honduran woman's petition for withholding of removal
specifically because she did not report being raped by her
boyfriend to the authorities.66 Her reasons for not reporting the
rape are what differentiate, in part, her petition from the petition in
Reyes-Reyes.67 She refrained from reporting, not out of fear of
persecution from the government as in Reyes, but because she
thought the authorities would not investigate, and she feared
retaliation from her father.68 These reasons simply did not compel
59 Id.
60 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
61 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785.
62 Specifically, the case concerns lack of reporting when there is precedent
documenting police abuse towards Latin American men with female sexual identities.
See id. at 789 n. 3.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 789.
65 409 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).
66 Id. at 1070-71.
67 Id. at 1072.
68 Id.
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a finding that the government bore any responsibility for her
abuse.69
In Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales,7 °  the petitioner suffered
persecution at the hands of government officials because he was a
homosexual. The Ninth Circuit found that the reporting
requirement was only to be considered in the context of torture at
the hands of non-governmental actors, but noted that the
petitioner's fear of the police was well-founded, and it was
reasonable for him not to report the abuse he suffered.71 While
this case does not rule that reporting of abuse cannot be required,
the dicta leans in the direction of not requiring reporting in its
discussion of the reasonableness of petitioner's fear of the police.72
The background law in the area of the Convention Against
Torture and the reporting of abuse to government officials is not
explicit in whether one who is tortured must report the abuse for
the state action element to be satisfied.73 The facts of these cases
allowed the Ninth Circuit to rule under other theories, but in its
explanations the court does tend to lean against a per se rule of
requiring individuals tortured by non-government officials to
report the torture to qualify for withholding of removal and
because similar logic can apply, for protection under the
Convention Against Torture.
IV. Analysis
The Convention Against Torture was written to protect human
dignity and create a safe-haven for tortured individuals in the
countries of the United Nations.74 The United Nations felt that it
was important to avoid sending people back to countries where
they would surely be tortured.75 Of course, while the language of
69 Id.
70 418 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
71 Id. at 1088.
72 See id. at 1090.
73 See generally GERMAIN, supra note 26.
74 Convention Against Torture, supra note 43, art. 1.
75 See generally id. at 2 ("No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture."); MARY ROBINSON, Foreword to
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN COMMI'TEE AGAINST TORTURE xiii
(Leif Holmstrom ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2000) (setting out the goals of the Convention
2007]
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the Convention Against Torture is very noble in providing for
punishment of torturers and protection for those subject to torture,
there should be limitations in its implementation. Because of the
prevalence of abuse and injury in other countries, especially third
world countries, the line should be drawn and only allow people to
avoid removal if it is the government of their home country or an
entity they cannot escape that tortured them and is likely to
continue the torture if they return.76
The United States' courts have struggled with analyzing
withholding of removal cases.77 In theory, it seems fair that the
government should have the opportunity to know about the abuse
before being deemed to have acquiesced to it.78 In practice, this
standard is too high due to the corruption that pervades many
governments.
When implementing the Convention Against Torture in the
United States, the legislature struggled with this issue of what
qualifies a foreign government for acquiescence to the torture of
its citizens.79 When President Reagan proposed conditions for the
United States to adopt, one of them was "an understanding that the
United States interpreted the term acquiescence to 're-quire[] that
the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have
knowledge of such activity."' 80  The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee did not agree with this definition of acquiescence and
accordingly said it "created the impression that the United States
Against Torture in a collection of suggestions concerning its implementation from
various countries).
76 See infra Part V.
77 See e.g., Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3 at 1088 (examining whether the petitioner's fear
of the police was well-founded and a reasonable justification for his failure to report his
torture); Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d at 782 (determining that a fear that the police would not
investigate a few incidents does not compel a finding that the government is responsible
for the abuse); Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 789 n. 3 (commenting in a note that a per se rule
would be "troubling," but remanding this case for other reasons and avoiding that issue);
Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1067 (finding that there is no need to report incidents of abuse
when the incidents occur at the hands of public officials).
78 "[W]hether the petitioner has reported the incidents to the authorities is clearly
relevant to, even if not dispositive of, the ultimate question of whether the government
was 'unwilling or unable to control' the persecutors." Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1062
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078).
79 See generally GERMAIN, supra note 26.
80 Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1192 (citing S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, at 15).
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was not serious in its commitment to end torture worldwide." 8'
Several years later, in 1990, the Bush administration proposed that
the public official only needed awareness of the torture, instead of
knowledge.82  It was with this amended language that the
Convention Against Torture was ratified in the United States.
83
What seemed to be clear legislative language when it was
drafted has not been easy to implement in the Immigration
Courts. 84 As cases arise, the courts are pressured to both take
torture seriously and avoid an excess of grants of withholding of
removal. Perhaps this conundrum is the reason behind the vague
holdings in the four cases described above analyzing this area of
what constitutes awareness of a foreign government.
Baballah appeared to lean in the direction of demanding
reporting of incidents to authorities when the torture is from a non-
governmental official.86 The court successfully avoided holding
either way on this issue, because Baballah concerned torture at the
hands of public officials.87 The court specifically notes that "in
such cases a report of this nature may show governmental inability
to control the actors."88 Fortunately for Ornelas-Chavez, Baballah
did not have similar facts and so the court's comments on what is
needed to show government awareness is inapplicable to a case of
torture at the hands of a non-governmental official.89
In Reyes-Reyes, the court again dodged a bullet by specifically
saying it was declining to decide on the per se rule requiring
reporting of incidents that had been used by the Immigration
Judge. 90 Interestingly, the court wrote a footnote about the trouble
this type of bright line rule would cause and detailed the abuse of
homosexuals at the hands of the police. 9' The political pressures
81 Id. at 1193.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g. Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d 1052.
85 Id.
86 Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078.
87 Id. at 1070-7 1.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1078.
90 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 789.
91 See id. at 789 n.3.
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surrounding the courts in these decisions are quite evident in
Reyes-Reyes. When given a great opportunity to rule on these
facts, the court finds its reasoning elsewhere and merely writes a
note on the issue.
The Castro-Perez court had unfortunate but simple facts to
address, and while the decision may make for bad law further
down the road, it was appropriate and reasonable under the
specific facts. The court was approached with a case in which an
individual was harmed at the hands of a private citizen and did not
report the incident. But the facts are not analogous to Ornelas-
Chavez and similar cases where it is clear the government would
not ignore the abuse but further it. Castro-Perez held that because
the petitioner did not report being raped to the police, the evidence
"[did] not compel a finding that the Honduran government is
unwilling or unable to control rape in that country." 9 Thankfully,
Ornelas-Chavez has now been decided and limits the holding of
Castro-Perez to its particular facts, where an individual is injured
once or twice at the hands of a private citizen and does not report
the incident simply because she feels it would not be
investigated. 93
Finally, in Boer-Sedano, while it was unnecessary to the
analysis, the court actually examined the reasonableness behind
the petitioner's failure to report.94 The torture in Boer-Sedano was
at the hands of a public official, and the Ninth Circuit cited
Baballah when stating that the Immigration Judge did not need to
address whether the incident was reported. 95 However, the Ninth
Circuit did not stop its analysis there; it continued on to discuss
that the petitioner in Boer-Sedano had every right not to report the
abuse because he was afraid that reporting it would simply
perpetuate his torture. 96 As repeated in Ornelas-Chavez, the Boer-
Sedano court notes that there are instances where it is only logical
for a tortured individual to refrain from reporting that torture to the
92 Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d at 1072.
93 Without Ornelas-Chavez, it could be argued that the court implemented a
reporting requirement and without that reporting of the incident, the government cannot
be found to have awareness of the abuse and torture.
94 Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1088.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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authorities.9 7
Ornelas-Chavez states that these four cases implicitly rule that
the courts cannot require petitioners to report incidents to the
authorities and that the court in Ornelas-Chavez is simply making
explicit what was already implicit.98  This is not accurate.
Baballah says the court should look at whether the incident was
reported when a non-governmental actor is responsible. 99 Reyes-
Reyes declined to rule on this issue and found its reasoning
elsewhere only commenting on the reporting requirement in a
note.'0° Castro-Perez specifically holds that the petitioner should
have reported the incidents to show acquiescence of the
government.101 And finally, Boer-Sedano discusses the
reasonableness behind the petitioner's failure to report, but does so
in a way that suggests it would be unreasonable to require the
petitioner to report to the authorities because it was the authorities
who were torturing him.' °2 Accordingly, it does not seem to be
much of a stretch from these cases to require an individual to
report his torture to the appropriate authorities to show
government acquiescence.
The language of the Convention Against Torture requires that
the government have awareness of the torture for the petitioner to
qualify for protection. 10 3 This is a reasonable restriction on the
Convention Against Torture because it is not the responsibility of
the United States government to protect individuals until their own
government has failed to do so.
The first expansion of the definition of awareness occurred in
Zheng.'O° There, the court discussed the legislative history of the
Convention Against Torture focusing on the change from
"knowledge" to "awareness."' 1 5  Because of this change, the
Zheng court held that "willful blindness" constitutes
97 Id. at 1088.
98 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1057-58.
99 Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1078.
100 Reyes-Ryes, 384 F.3d at 789.
101 Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d at 1072.
102 Boer-Sedano, 418 at 1088.
103 8 C.F.R. 208.18(a) (7) (2006).
104 Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1193.
105 See id. at 1195.
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"awareness." 10 6 Therefore, after Zheng, the government no longer
has to have actual knowledge of the torture. Arguably, this could
be a proper interpretation of the legislative language and history.
However, it is expanding protection under the Convention Against
Torture from what it originally may have included.
The next leap occurs here in Ornelas-Chavez. The cases
leading up to Ornelas-Chavez suggested that a problem may arise
when an individual is afraid to report his torture by a private party
to the authorities.'07 It seems unfair to charge the government with
awareness of incidents that have not been directly reported to
them. Yet, Zheng is analogous. Considering the corruption in the
foreign nations these petitioners are fleeing from, it is entirely
possible that the government has awareness of the torture in
general but refuses to do anything about it. 0 8  To require
individuals to report torture would undermine the purpose behind
the Convention Against Torture. It seems unlikely, that one would
report the incidents despite the possible persecution from the
government, simply to comply with the requirements necessary for
protection under the Convention Against Torture.1 09 Effectively,
tortured petitioners would consistently be removed to their
countries of origin because they tried to, protect themselves from
further abuse by avoiding contact with their governments.
On the other side, however, these foreign governments should
be given the chance to stop torture by non-governmental
authorities before they are charged with acquiescence to it.110
Without requiring reporting, it is entirely possible that while the
government is aware of persecution in general, it is not able to
106 See id. at 1194-95.
107 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1057.
108 See e.g., Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the widespread abuse of homosexuals by the general public and police).
109 See Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 789 n. 3 (stating that rape victims in El Salvador
tend to not report these crimes because of a lack of response from authorities).
110 This argument is somewhat discussed in Judge O'Scannlain's dissent in Ornelas-
Chavez. See Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1061-70 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
O'Scannlain noted that the evidence presented by Ornelas-Chavez did not show that the
court "would not have acted to curb the persecution he alleges took place." Id. at 1062.
O'Scannlain discusses that general mistreatment of a particular group (homosexuals in
this case) throughout a country is not evidence of acquiescence by public officials. See
id. at 1062.
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punish particular individuals because it does not know specifically
who is inflicting the torture."' It does not appear that the
Convention Against Torture was meant to reach these types of
situations where the government has simply not been given the
chance to address the actions of private individuals." 2
The courts are left to strike a balance. Under the Convention
Against Torture, the United States does not want to deport
individuals who are likely to face torture in their home countries
upon their return." 3 The United States also, however, does not
want to open its doors and withhold removal for individuals who
never gave their own governments a chance to protect them.
14
Nor does the United States want to require tortured individuals to
risk further abuse by reporting incidents to a government likely to
inflict more torture upon them.' 15
Ornelas-Chavez extends the Convention Against Torture to
protect individuals who suffered torture at the hands of private
parties and did not report the incidents for fear of further
persecution from the government." 6 While the Ninth Circuit
strikes down a per se rule requiring individuals to report incidents,
it does not (and procedurally cannot) analyze the facts in Ornelas-
Chavez's case. In essence, the appellate court has expanded the
coverage of the Convention Against Torture beyond perhaps what
it was meant to include but leaves an incredible amount of wiggle
room by not discussing to what facts the rule should apply.
The problem remains; of when a petitioner is reasonable in not
reporting incidents of torture for fear of further persecution. This
determination is procedurally left to the Board of Immigration
Appeals." 7 Clearly, the Castro-Perez case is binding in instances
where the abuse happens at the hands of one individual and the
1 1 See id. at 1061-62.
112 Id.
113 See supra Part III: Background Law, Protection Under the Convention Against
Torture.
114 There is a growing concern in the United States about excessive immigration.
While the majority of the argument surrounds illegal immigration, there is debate about
when people from other nations should be- allowed to move here permanently.
1 This is a public policy concern.
116 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d 1052.
117 See id. at 25.
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petitioner does not report the incident simply because she feels the
police will not investigate and her father will get upset.'18 Any
other fact pattern, however, must be evaluated by the Immigration
Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals." 9 In essence, the
holding in Ornelas-Chavez has no teeth.
The Board of Immigration Appeals has leaned towards
preferring petitioners to report incidents of torture to the
authorities to demonstrate government acquiescence.'20  This
preference can be inferred from its decision in Ornelas-Chavez,
where it applied too high of a standard and specifically refused to
consider those incidents that occurred at the hands of private
individuals and went unreported.' 2' There is nothing in the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ornelas-Chavez that requires the Board of
Immigration Appeals to refrain from harshly evaluating the facts
of the case. Under this holding, it would be too easy for a court to
reach the same result without expressly saying it did not look at
unreported incidents. In fact, the decision almost seems to say that
while the court cannot always require reporting of incidents, it can
in certain undefined circumstances. 22
Further, upon review, it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit
would find the Board of Immigration Appeals' evaluation of the
facts to be too harsh. In past cases, the Ninth Circuit has skirted
around the issue of a per se rule of reporting.123 In some of the
cases, the court leaned towards requiring reporting. 124 Especially
when the facts are as politically unpopular as they are in Ornelas-
Chavez, where the petitioner was a homosexual man who entered
the United States illegally, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit
would uphold a harsh evaluation of the facts leading to a denial of
the petitioner's claim for protection under the Convention Against
Torture for political reasons.2 5
118 See Castro-Perez, 409 F.3d 1069.
119 See Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (noting that it is not the Court of Appeals'
duty to review the evidence independently).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1055.
122 See id. at 1057.
123 See supra Part III: Background Law.
124 Id.
125 It seems plausible that the four decisions discussed in this note were decided as
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While this holding arguably has no teeth, as discussed above,
conversely it may be opening the door to a slippery slope. Under
the Convention Against Torture, there is an interest in giving the
foreign governments the opportunity to address their own issues of
torture at the hands of private individuals. 26  If read broadly,
Ornelas-Chavez could stand for the proposition that it is likely that
foreign governments have constructive knowledge of torture in
general, and should therefore be found to have general awareness
of and acquiesced to torture, even without specific awareness of it.
It is clear that there would likely be an incredible boom in the
population of immigrants if every individual who was a victim of
abuse in his home country because he is part of a politically
unpopular group often targeted and not protected by their
government could escape to the United States and claim protection
under the Convention Against Torture. Particularly with
individuals becoming more open about homosexuality, they are
more likely to suffer abuse in their home countries and flee to the
United States. If Ornelas-Chavez is read broadly, the Immigration
Judges have to grant these immigrants protection under the
Convention Against Torture, even if they never sought protection
from their own government. 27
Further, the question remains, without proper reporting to the
authorities, what evidence is there that the abuse actually
occurred? Presumably, when an individual reports an incident to
the police, there is some sort of record kept. Furthermore, if
petitioners are more open with their governments, they are likely
to have been more open with other individuals who could be
witnesses that the abuse or torture actually happened. Without
requiring official proof of events and acquiescence by the
government, the door is open to various false claims and an
overwhelming number of petitioners eligible for protection under
the Convention Against Torture.
The Ornelas-Chavez case eliminates the use of a per se rule
they were for political reasons. As unpopular as homosexuality is in Mexico, it is not
always overtly accepted in the United States either.
126 See supra Part III: Background Law, Protection Under the Convention Against
Torture.
127 This is especially important as the times are changing and more foreign
governments, much like the United States, are becoming more outwardly accepting of
homosexuality. Whether they are in fact accepting of homosexuality is unclear.
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requiring reporting of incidents of torture.'28 On one hand, the
case has no teeth and may not result in any difference in findings
by the Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals.
On the other hand, the decision creates a slippery slope.
V. Conclusion
The Ornelas-Chavez decision was inevitable due to the public
policy of not requiring tortured individuals to report incidents in
order to protect them from the possibility of further torture by their
own governments. However, this holding needs to be tightened.
It seems quite likely that this is not the end of the Ninth Circuit's
discussion in this area.
It is not clear how much evidence of abuse and torture, or how
much evidence of governmental persecution, needs to be presented
to qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture.
The facts in this case are extreme and deal with a hot political
topic in the United States. Two courts have unpublished opinions
ruling the same way, 129 also in cases dealing with homosexual
men, and it will be interesting to see if other circuits follow suit or
if the holding in Ornelas-Chavez gets tightened to give it some
teeth and avoid the slippery slope problem.
In conclusion, perhaps the Convention Against Torture was
not meant to be stretched so far as to cover cases where the torture
is at the hands of private individuals. The European cases
concerning the Convention Against Torture seem to emphasize the
importance of state action in granting protection to petitioners. 130
The United States courts and legislature are extremely vulnerable
to political influences as demonstrated by the language change in
the implementation of the Convention Against Torture. Perhaps
the case of Ornelas-Chavez was meant to be a political move of
the Ninth Circuit to demonstrate that the United States is accepting
of homosexuals and will not stand for their torture in other
128 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058.
129 See Morett v. Gonzales, No. 05-5450, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 18152 (6th Cir.
July 13, 2006); Safadi v. Gonzales, No. 03-4592, 148 Fed. Appx. 372 (6th Cir. Aug. 9,
2005).
130 See Alan v. Switzerland (Communication 21/95), U.N. Committee Against
Torture, 1 BHRC 598 (May 8, 1996).
131 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2006)..
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countries. Alternatively, this may be an attempt for the United
States to be the country that grants protection in torture cases to
further demonstrate that the United States is serious about
stopping torture throughout the world. Whatever the motivations
behind this decision, it remains in need of tightening to give it
teeth and prevent the creation of a slippery slope.
REBEKAH GONCAROVS
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXIII
